Except for timely election info, the extensive list of voting resources will now be at the end.

“There’s a reason why you separate military and police. One fights the enemy of the State. The other serves and protects the People. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the State tend to become the People.” ~ Commander Adama, “Battlestar Galactica” (“WATER”, Season 1 episode 2, at the 28 minute mark.)

“The policeman isn’t there to create disorder. The policeman is there to preserve disorder” (0:05) ~ Mayor Richard J. Daley’s 1968 police speech was a misspoken response to criticism of Chicago police brutality during the Democratic National Convention (Quote starts at 0:39)

Welcome to Thinkwing Radio with Mike Honig on KPFT Houston at 90.1-HD2, Galveston 89.5-HD2, and Huntsville 91.9-HD2. KPFT is Houston’s Community radio. 

And welcome to our international visitors from Canada, Shanghai, Iraq, India, and elsewhere. 

On this show, we discuss local, state, national, and international stories that may have slipped under your radar. At my website, THINKWINGRADIO-dot-COM, I link to all the articles I read and cite, as well as other relevant sources. Articles and commentaries often include lots of internet links for those of you who want to dig deeper. 

It’s the 20th week of Trump’s military occupation of Washington DC; 11 weeks since Trump deployed National Guard troops to Memphis, Tennessee; and an ongoing federal law enforcement occupation in Chicago. Federalized California Guard troops have finely been removed from Los Angeles, as per court order.

 There have been various court rulings that these military actions in US cities are illegal under the Posse Comitatus  Act, but our lawless regime is still resisting compliance. To be continued … 

I’d like to make a footnote here. Over the past few months, this show has been overwhelmed with national news of the Trump era. It’s been inescapable, as I’m sure many of you know, but the news doesn’t end at our borders. I’ve decided to try to minimize my discussion of those sorts of stories that are being widely covered by other media.  

Instead, as my mission is partly to point out stories that may have slipped under your radar, I’m trying to highlight more international news that is now often drowned out by Trumpist horrors. 

Due to time constraints, some stories will be longer in this show post than in the broadcast show.

1. Leading off, I thought that this article from WFAA from November 23 is interesting — How much do you need to earn to live comfortably in the Houston area?; Author: Sammy Turner, Rachel Snyder (WFAA) | KHOU.COM | Published: 8:27 AM CST November 23, 2025/Updated: 8:27 AM CST November 23, 2025. TAGS: U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Policy Institute, Greater Houston area, Cost-Of-Living,
   1. A new study suggests [that] residents [in the Greater Houston area] need to make nearly $100,000 a year to live comfortably … .
   2. Upgraded Points, a company that offers advice on travel and finances, calculated the minimum income needed to sustain a financially comfortable lifestyle in various U.S. cities using data from the Economic Policy Institute and the U.S. Census Bureau.
   3. [The report states,] “American families are facing a convergence of economic pressures that are redefining what it means to live comfortably. After years of elevated inflation, the cost of essentials — from housing and groceries to transportation and health care — remains persistently high. At the same time, artificial intelligence is rapidly being adopted in the workplace, introducing more uncertainty in traditionally stable white-collar industries and adding to the financial strain of many middle- and upper-middle-income earners. … In this environment, understanding how much income you need not just to get by but to live comfortably is top of mind for many Americans.”
   4. Researchers utilized the 50/30/20 rule for budgeting to determine what’s comfortable. According to that rule, a well-balanced budget allocates 50% of income to necessities, 30% to discretionary spending, and 20% to savings or debt repayment.
   5. For the Houston-Pasadena-The Woodlands region, an adult living alone needs to earn a salary of $93,818 to live comfortably. For two adults living without children, that goes up to a combined $122,815. A couple with one kid needs to earn $165,970 and with two kids it goes up to $200,036. Add in a third kid, and couples need to earn a combined $238,393 to be comfortable in the Houston area.
   6. However, the median income for an individual in the Greater Houston area sits at $47,025, according to the report, and the median family income is $101,941, far lower than what the report suggests is necessary to live comfortably.
   7. Statewide [in Texas], a salary of $96,506 is needed to live comfortably for a single person with no children, nearly $126,000 for two adults with no children, $168,583 for two adults with a child, and $241,311 for a family of five, the report shows. 
   8. Nationally, a single adult with no children in 2025 needs $106,745 per year, two adults with no children need a combined $138,643, two adults with a child need $194,038, and a family of five needs $278,252, according to the report. 
   9. The most expensive states in the country are along the West Coast and Northeast, with Hawaii, New York, California, and Massachusetts at the top of the list, and single adults needing over $130,000 per year to live comfortably.
   10. MIKE: This reminds me of the frequent articles I see about how young people should be saving for when they retire. The typical recommendation is that people should be saving and investing at least 10% of their earnings for retirement.
   11. MIKE: At a time when most people in this country have savings that might keep them afloat for a month or three, that recommendation always strikes me as being dark humor.
   12. MIKE: According to CensusReporter-dot-ORG, slightly less than 13% of households break the $200 thousand level for ‘getting by’ with a 4-person household. Households earning between $100,000 and $200,000 comprise 27% of households in the metro area.
   13. MIKE: And reiterating the story’s statistic, “the median income for an individual in the Greater Houston area sits at $47,025, … and … median family income is $101,941.”
   14. MIKE: So one must ask, What is wrong with this picture? Why, according to these statistics, are about 70% of metro-Houston households — and a similar percentage of Texas households — just struggling to get by?
   15. MIKE: This should be a central issue for Texas legislators and business leaders, and maybe political candidates. The Republicans in Austin that run this state should be held to account for answers.
2. Texas A&M System tightens restrictions on discussing race and gender in class; by Jessica Priest | TEXASTRIBUNE.ORG | Dec. 18, 2025, 2:54 p.m. Central/Dec. 18, 2025, 5:11 p.m. Central. TAGS: Texas A&M University System, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Texas A&M University System Regents,
   1. About a month after adopting a policy requiring approval for courses that address race, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity, Texas A&M University System regents on Thursday approved changes that faculty worry might effectively ban those topics in introductory-level courses.
   2. Regents approved the revisions during a special meeting on Thursday without reading the updated language aloud or discussing its substance in open session. System officials provided a copy of the new language hours after regents had approved it. 
   3. [MIKE: I’ve included the link to that document at the bottom of this story. Continuing …]
   4. According to the revised text, “no system academic course will advocate race or gender ideology, or topics related to sexual orientation or gender identity,” with a narrow exception for certain non-core curriculum or graduate courses. Those exempted course materials must first be reviewed, show that they serve a “necessary educational purpose” and be approved in writing by the campus president. …
   5. Chris Bryan, the system’s vice chancellor for marketing and communications, did not say what prompted the change, how “necessary educational purpose” will be defined, or who will make that determination. In a statement, he said, “These updates simply make clear which academic courses the policy applies to and outline the process for reviewing and approving those courses.”
   6. [Bryan continued, saying, ] “This is not a change in direction or a more restrictive policy; it is a straightforward clarification to ensure consistency, transparency, and alignment across the System.” …
   7. Several faculty members said the revised policy left them unsure of how administrators would interpret and enforce the new language, particularly in introductory or required courses, with the spring semester set to begin on Jan. 12.
   8. Martin Peterson, a philosophy professor who chairs Texas A&M’s Academic Freedom Council but said he was commenting on the new policy as a private citizen, called the changes approved Thursday “outright censorship.” 
   9. Peterson said he believes the revised policy will bar him from teaching parts of his PHIL 111: Contemporary Moral Issues course, though he has not received formal guidance from administrators. He said the course has typically covered moral questions related to race, gender, and sexual orientation, including whether affirmative action is ethical, the moral justification for Texas’ bathroom bill, and differing views on sexual relations and gender identity.
   10. [Professor Peterson said,] “My students are adults and need to learn to structure their arguments for or against.”
   11. Another faculty member, who asked not to be named out of concern that speaking publicly could affect their job, said the revised policy raises questions about how it could affect degree requirements for all undergraduates. 
   12. Undergrads have to choose a class from a list to fulfill a cultural discourse requirement. The list includes courses like Introduction to Race and Ethnicity, Introduction to Women’s and Gender Studies, Social and Cultural Anthropology, and Contemporary Moral Issues. The catalog says those classes are intended to help students “hold respectful discussions and discourse on difficult topics,” “understand self, including personal bias and prejudices,” and examine power, privilege and conflict from multiple viewpoints. 
   13. The professor said those courses necessarily involve discussions of race and gender, and that the new restrictions could affect most of the classes on the list.  
   14. The Texas A&M University System adopted the first version of the policy in November, after a student’s secret recording of a professor discussing gender identity in a children’s literature class sparked conservative backlash and scrutiny of course content across the system.
   15. The earlier policy required campus presidents to sign off on any course that could be seen as advocating “race or gender ideology, or topics related to sexual orientation or gender identity.” It was approved alongside new rules barring faculty from teaching material inconsistent with approved syllabi. 
   16. System leaders at the time framed the changes as an effort to ensure transparency and consistency in instruction. Faculty worried that university administrators would interpret what teachings amount to advocacy too broadly and bar those topics across disciplines, including history, medicine, public health and law.
   17. In a frequently asked questions document circulated after the earlier version of the policy was approved, Texas A&M University-San Antonio and Tarleton State University faculty were told that “advocating” means requiring students to hold certain beliefs and/or ridiculing certain beliefs. They said examples of this would be leading, encouraging or requiring students to feel personal shame over the treatment of slaves in America or to hold certain beliefs on same-sex relationships, gender identity, religion or politics.
   18. The FAQ also emphasized that faculty are expected to teach “historically significant, empirically established and discipline-grounded topics,” even when they may be “emotionally difficult or sensitive for some students.” The document says faculty were not barred from teaching covering slavery and racism or the Holocaust in U.S. history courses, or same-sex relationships in classes on human sexuality.
   19. Other university systems have also launched course audits in recent months, saying the reviews are necessary to comply with new state laws or presidential directives, though no state or federal law explicitly bars professors from teaching about race, gender or sexual orientation. 
   20. This month, Texas Tech University System restricted faculty from promoting or advocating certain race- or sex-based beliefs, and required instructors who include content related to those topics in their courses to submit that material for review, allowing the material to remain only if it is required for professional licensure, certification or patient and client care, or if it is approved by administrators and, in some cases, the board of regents.
   21. At Texas State, administrators have urged professors to drop words such as “challenging,” “dismantling” and “decolonizing” from their course descriptions and to rename courses with titles like “Combating Racism in Healthcare” to something university officials consider more neutral like “Race and Public Health in America.”
   22. MIKE: This is actually a tricky subject. On the one hand, it bears on what curricula are necessary, appropriate, and in the public interest for what grade and course levels. Those sorts of concerns are legitimate educational questions.
   23. MIKE: On the other hand, free speech issues are involved here as well.
   24. MIKE: The First Amendment to the US Constitution is very clear on the subject of government censorship. That amendment says in part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;…”
   25. MIKE: The Texas State Constitution has a similar provision from Feb. 15, 1876, Article 1, Section 8, which says in relevant part: “Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. …”
   26. MIKE: So the US and Texas Constitutions are in agreement, more or less.
   27. MIKE: As is often pointed out in these discussions, prohibitions regarding curtailment of free speech applies to government, and not to private institutions or individuals. There is typically a caveat, however, when private institutions or corporations take government money. Then the government free speech provisions are usually invoked, even in court cases.
   28. MIKE: Google Ai states it thusly with a helpful link: “Yes, your understanding is largely correct: First Amendment free speech claims against private entities often arise in court when the government ties its funding to speech conditions, effectively making the government the “speaker” or coercing private actors to limit speech, triggering scrutiny over whether the state is impermissibly censoring or steering private expression, though the government can generally set terms for its own speech (the government speech doctrine), creating a complex legal area.”
   29. MIKE: In this case, to me as a lay person, it almost becomes irrelevant whether the Texas A&M system is an arm of the Texas government or not — although it clearly is, since the Texas governor appoints the people on the A&M board of regents — since A&M takes government money.
   30. MIKE: So I can’t help but ask the question, how are these government-mandated course restrictions — these blatant attempts at government censorship of speech, thought, and writing — are legal under the articles and amendments of both the US and Texas constitutions?
   31. MIKE: I can only conclude by saying, “Inquiring minds want to know.”
   32. Reference: Read the Texas A&M University System’s revised policy restricting how race and gender are taught – Download
3. I don’t necessarily agree or disagree with the following analysis from FOREIGNAFFAIRS-dot-COM, but I think it’s important to read in order to understand the strategic and tactical choices that America’s military must make in an environment where money and industrial capability are not infinite — America’s Drone Delusion; By Justin Bronk | FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM | December 15, 2025. TAGS: United States, China, Geopolitics, Security, Defense & Military, Strategy & Conflict, War & Military, Strategy, S.-Chinese Relations, War in Ukraine,
   1. After nearly four years of fighting, few aspects of Russia’s war in Ukraine have gained as much attention among Western militaries as the rapid expansion of drone warfare. Since 2023, both sides have deployed millions of cheap quadcopter-type drones across the battlefield. In some parts of the front, these small drones now account for up to 70 percent of battlefield casualties. Meanwhile, Russia is using thousands of Geran-2 and Geran-3 propeller-powered one-way attack drones in almost nightly long-range strikes on Ukrainian cities, and Ukraine has been using a wide array of its own one-way attack drones for regular strikes on Russian bases, factories, and energy infrastructure.
   2. Watching these developments, many Western defense strategists have made urgent calls to shift military priorities. In June, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order to accelerate drone production. Since then, the U.S. Department of Defense has made several policy changes to facilitate the rapid integration of low-cost drones into the U.S. arsenal, and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has called for the United States to establish “drone dominance.” In the private sector, meanwhile, software and AI companies that have bet heavily on developing uncrewed military technologies, such as Anduril, Palantir, and Shield AI, are racing to win lucrative new defense contracts. It is certainly the case that small uncrewed aircraft systems have fundamentally changed the way that infantry combat is fought, and that the U.S. Army and other parts of the force are behind on these capabilities — and, more concerning, on counter-UAS technologies — compared to Russian or Chinese forces.
   3. But the assumption that large-scale acquisition of AI-enabled drones will strengthen U.S. defenses against China is misguided. For one thing, lessons from the war in Ukraine—an attritional, inconclusive struggle between two fundamentally land-centric armed forces—often do not apply directly to other kinds of conflicts. The realities of Beijing’s military arsenal and the likely nature of any potential confrontation in the Indo-Pacific mean that such a conflict would be decided by very different factors. Despite having the largest and most advanced drone industry in the world, China has actually been prioritizing crewed military hardware. Each year, the People’s Liberation Army receives eye-watering numbers of modern and highly capable combat aircraft, large warships, and cutting-edge ground-based, maritime, and air-launched missile systems. If the United States focuses too heavily on drone development and acquisition, it risks losing its slim remaining edge over the PLA in the high-end air force and navy capabilities that would dominate any Indo-Pacific conflict.
   4. … Over the past few years, military analysts and defense industry executives alike have focused on the lessons that Western militaries should supposedly take from Ukraine’s remarkable defense against Russia. One result of this interest has been an oversaturation of new defense products and technologies that are being marketed to Western militaries as “transformational,” based on vaguely described combat use in Ukraine. In fact, many such systems, especially Western-made drones from tech startup firms, have proved ineffective or even failed outright on the battlefield in the face of omnipresent Russian (and Ukrainian) electronic warfare and hard environmental conditions.
   5. A larger problem, however, is that the war in Ukraine features many characteristics that would not apply to U.S. and Chinese forces in an Indo-Pacific context. Russia’s ongoing ground invasion of Ukraine has resulted in sparsely manned frontlines stretching more than 600 miles from Kharkiv Oblast in the north to Kherson in the south. Neither side has achieved air superiority, making airpower far less significant than in other modern conflicts. Since both Russian and Ukrainian armored formations and other elite units suffered catastrophic losses in the early phases of the war, neither side has been able to conduct large-scale combined-arms maneuver warfare since mid-2023. As a result, both armies have had to rely heavily on small infantry units with attached tank, artillery, and drone support to make probing attacks through minefields against fixed defensive lines. Progress is grindingly slow and costly in both directions.
   6. Under these conditions, short-range, lightweight, cheap, and mass-produced quadcopter-type drones have proved highly effective. Especially as conventional artillery and long-range rocket artillery ammunition and launchers have become increasingly scarce, both sides have used cheap drones to inflict attrition and suppress the enemy’s resupply and tactical movements within six to 12 miles of the frontlines. By 2024, frontline combat had indeed come to be dominated by ever greater numbers of drones and the constant development of new technologies such as fiber-optic drones and AI-assisted terminal imaging guidance. Counterdrone defenses such as netting, electronic jamming, and specialized shotgun and cannon ammunition types have likewise become critical and continue to evolve rapidly. However, many active counterdrone defense systems are overstretched in Ukraine due to the widely dispersed nature of forces on the frontlines and constant attrition.
   7. Even so, the expansion of drone warfare is arguably not what has prevented Ukrainian forces from holding key positions against Russian forces in 2024 and 2025. Instead, it is the hundreds of heavy glide bombs that Russia is delivering by Su-34 fighter-bombers against the frontlines each week. These 500kg–3000kg glide bombs can demolish even deep, hardened fighting positions and kill dug-in troops far more effectively than small drones, and Ukraine still lacks an effective way to intercept the launch aircraft that release the bombs from more than 40 miles behind the frontlines. Drones inflict the majority of day-to-day attrition against infantry and vehicles on the move in and around the frontlines, but concentrated glide bomb attacks pose a much greater threat to dug-in troops. Relentless Russian glide bomb strikes on key positions have been particularly difficult for Ukrainian troops fighting to hold heavily fortified strategic locations, such as the hilltop city of Chasiv Yar in Donetsk Oblast.
   8. … In sharp contrast to the operational conditions in Ukraine, any likely conflict between U.S. forces and China’s People’s Liberation Army would unfold predominantly in the air and at sea, with combat between land forces likely limited to key islands such as Taiwan or the Senkakus (known in China as the Diaoyus). In this context, success for the United States would depend on the ability to rapidly and repeatedly bring decisive airborne and maritime firepower to bear at those key points at critical moments. This would mean projecting power across thousands of miles of ocean against numerous highly advanced Chinese missile, air, and maritime threats. Such operations would require highly trained personnel manning advanced fighter aircraft, bombers, and warships conducting mutually supporting actions in carefully synchronized joint operations. In other words, the conflict would involve very different kinds of forces and equipment from what either Ukraine or Russia is using in the current war.
   9. In an Indo-Pacific conflict, drones would likely still play a significant role in land and amphibious operations. Taiwan, for example, could greatly benefit from being able to deploy hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of small drones to repel a PLA landing force on its beaches. It would also be essential for Taiwanese forces to have counterdrone capabilities that could sustainably intercept and jam PLA one-way attack drones and surveillance drones flying from the mainland or from ships off the beaches. Yet such uncrewed systems would be useless to the U.S. Air Force and Navy in their efforts to assist with air cover and, ultimately, maritime support, which would require projecting power from Guam or other distant U.S. bases.
   10. Distances are punishing in the Indo-Pacific. The greatest shortcoming of the current generation of “exquisite” American fighter aircraft — the F-22, F-35, and F/A-18E/F — against growing Chinese threats is not that they are expensive and comparatively few. It is their comparatively limited range. With combat radii of between 350 and 600 miles, they require aerial refueling tankers to reach contested areas from viable bases, which in conflict would have to fly dangerously close to Chinese missile and fighter aircraft threats. Small drones cannot solve this problem. Even the longest-range fiber-optic-cable-equipped first-person view drones in common use in Ukraine are limited to around 15 miles, and most small FPVs have significantly shorter ranges than that. In other words, the one weapons system that has made combat in Ukraine significantly different from that of previous state-on-state wars would be largely irrelevant in the critical early phases of a conflict between Chinese and American forces.
   11. The United States has a shrinking and increasingly aging conventional force structure.
   12. [MIKE: This is something I touch on over and over again. As I see it, the greatest risk of a major war with China or others is our insufficient capacity to deter one. Continuing …]
   13. Even if small drones could be delivered rapidly across the required ranges, none of the varieties currently in use in Ukraine by either side could effectively defend U.S. forces against Chinese attacks. Beijing already operates thousands of high-end ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles that would be used to strike U.S. forward bases, aircraft carriers, tanker aircraft, and other key large assets. To counter such threats, the U.S. military would unavoidably have to rely on multimillion-dollar missile defense systems … . Intercepting hundreds of increasingly capable Chinese combat aircraft will, likewise, require large quantities of advanced air-to-air missiles … . These will be needed in large quantities regardless of whether they are launched by crewed fighters or, potentially, in the future by AI-enabled uncrewed systems. Small drones simply cannot intercept combat aircraft operating at high altitudes and speeds.
   14. Moreover, the many types of uncrewed systems that would potentially be far more useful in the Indo-Pacific will entail large costs of their own. For example, stealthy Collaborative Combat Aircraft [CCAs] — automated or AI-enabled uncrewed combat aircraft intended to accompany and support traditional fighters — are expected to cost as much as $20 million to $30 million apiece. The less ambitious designs that are intended to be little more than forward sensors and weapon-launching “trucks” will still cost many millions of dollars. There may well be significant benefits to their development and adoption, but they cannot be “swarmed” or expended en masse on a regular basis given their cost.
   15. Operating these systems will also require large numbers of human maintainers, armorers, logisticians, force protection personnel, and other specialists to prepare them for flight, recover them after use, maintain them, and move them to launch locations in theater — personnel who will have to be reassigned from other activities. CCAs also will not fundamentally change the U.S. military’s position relative to the PLA, since China is developing similar systems.
   16. Simpler, one-way attack, decoy, or stand-in jamming-type drones can be somewhat cheaper to produce and could still perform vital roles within a complex joint strike package. But even these drones will likely cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to be able to have the required range and performance. AI-enabled swarming behavio­rs in flight may increase the effectiveness of such drones or missiles in various tactical situations, but the data links and processing power required will further increase unit cost, and thus quantities will remain limited. Weapons that serve much the same purposes — smart stand-off attack, decoys, and stand-in jammers — have already existed for decades in the form of cruise missiles and decoys … . The issue is not that these existing tools are unable to perform the required roles; it is that the United States does not have enough of them.
   17. … For the United States, it is unavoidably clear that a significant peer conflict will require very different resourcing than the overseas interventions and counterinsurgency operations that it has conducted in recent decades. In any confrontation with China, the U.S. military would need vast stockpiles of ammunition, spare parts, medical supplies, and other logistical necessities. Washington currently has significant shortfalls of key long-range strike, antiship, and interceptor missiles, and most of its allies lack them to a greater degree still. The United States also has a shrinking and increasingly aging conventional force structure thanks to more than a decade of deferred air force and navy modernization during the global war on terrorism. The sheer cost of bringing back “combat mass” with conventional high-end military systems has driven an almost frantic search by many defense analysts and policymakers for a way to get AI-enabled technology, including drones, to deliver “cheap mass.”
   18. The PLA, by contrast, increasingly has both mass and quality. Strikingly, despite having by far the world’s largest and most advanced drone-manufacturing industrial base, China’s major military focus is on acquiring more crewed combat aircraft, large warships, and advanced missile systems. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is on course to have a fleet of around 1,000 J-20s — China’s primary fifth-generation stealth fighter — by 2030. China is also building many hundreds of advanced antiship and long-range surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, and tens of advanced destroyers and cruisers per year. Especially in the air-to-air and surface-to-air missile domain, many of these Chinese systems are starting to exceed the performance of their U.S. equivalents in some key areas. Almost all of this production is going to the PLA rather than to export customers like Pakistan, and much of it would likely be brought to bear in any Chinese attempt to capture Taiwan, as well as any other conflict involving Beijing in the East China or South China Seas.
   19. By comparison, while Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighters are being built at a slightly higher rate than China’s J-20A and J-20S, only some of that production is being purchased by the U.S. military. The U.S. Air Force purchased just 48 F-35As in 2025 and plans to purchase fewer than that in each of the remaining years of the current decade. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are acquiring other variants of the fighter, but most of the balance of Lockheed Martin’s current output is destined for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. The next generation F-47 fighter, which is expected to cost more than $300 million apiece, is not scheduled to enter U.S. Air Force service until the early 2030s as a production standard combat asset. An equivalent next-generation program for the U.S. Navy, called F/A-XX, will come even later still, assuming the program goes ahead. By that point, however, the next-generation Chinese J-36, J-XDS, and J-50 equivalents, all of which are already in flight testing, will likely also be in service. They may be marginally less capable than the F-47 on a per-aircraft basis, but they will likely be produced faster and in greater numbers.
   20. There are no easy answers to the challenge posed by China’s growing military capabilities.
   21. Another area in which China’s high-end capabilities are already outstripping those of the United States is in airborne long-range early warning and command system (AWACS) aircraft. These aircraft are huge force multipliers because they provide air forces and joint forces with long-range, wide-area radar coverage for early warning, battlespace management, and targeting. The PLA already has roughly 60 modern AWACS, all equipped with the latest active electronically scanned array-type radars and advanced data link and satellite communications capabilities to act as network nodes. More are being produced each year.
   22. By contrast, the U.S. Air Force has only 16 serviceable AWACS, and these are the nearly obsolete and badly worn-out E-3G Sentry. The plan to acquire the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail to replace this rapidly shrinking fleet was canceled by Hegseth in June 2025, citing concerns over cost overruns, delays, and operational vulnerability. Congress included $400 million to continue the program in the bipartisan bill to end the U.S. government shutdown in November, but even if the program does survive, it may be downsized and still faces significant delays. That means that the United States will face an airborne sensor and airborne networking and battle management node gap with China for at least a decade. Both nations are pursuing advanced space-based sensor and networking capabilities, but these are not yet ready to replace AWACS coverage.
   23. The uncomfortable fact is that there are no easy answers to the challenge posed by China’s growing air, maritime, and missile capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. To an overwhelming degree, the U.S. military relies on its air force and navy to credibly deter Chinese military aggression against Taiwan or elsewhere. There is no way to change the entire joint force to a fundamentally different structure in time to face the threat in the coming years. Trying to replicate Ukraine’s emphasis on drones at a vast scale will not solve the problem. American military and political decision-makers should focus instead on fixing the increasingly large gaps in existing conventional air and maritime forces. To do this, Washington has few alternatives to urgent, heavy investment in far greater production capacity and rapid procurement of existing long-range air-to-air, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface missiles, as well as F-35, F-47, and B-21 combat aircraft and nuclear attack submarines.
   24. Dealing with these critical shortfalls will require either major budget increases — unlikely in the current environment — or major cuts elsewhere in the joint force structure. But unless the United States can maintain air and maritime superiority over key contested areas, it will find that the rest of its military force structure will struggle to produce relevant combat power against China in any Indo-Pacific clash. Millions of battlefield quadcopters and tens of thousands of one-way attack drones have not enabled Russia to defeat Ukraine, or vice versa. Even if the Pentagon acquires similar capabilities, they will not change its rapidly degrading balance of power with China in the Indo-Pacific, no matter how good swarms of AI-enabled drones might look on PowerPoint slides.
   25. MIKE: As I see it, the US has a significant defense conundrum here. We are in many ways a vast island nation. We project power in Europe as a land and air power, and in Asia as an air and naval power.
   26. MIKE: Since Korea and Vietnam, the US has an unofficial doctrine of avoiding a land war in Asia. We might now add Afghanistan as a reminder of this aversion. Asia’s land area is vast and complex, the populations are huge, and the US lacks any reliable land-based Asian allies of consequence to aid us in the event of a war there.
   27. MIKE: Our interests and capabilities in Asia are really best described as the Indo-Pacific theater. That is to say, we have an interest in defending certain island nations and territories — Japan, Taiwan, Guam, etc. — and perhaps some coastal areas. A sole exception — no pun intended — would be South Korea (the ROK).
   28. MIKE: But even in the case of the South Korea, as a peninsula nation with a highly capable military and military-industrial base, the US could hopefully offer support mainly from the sea and air.
   29. MIKE: The so-called Davidson Window again applies here. The US has too much old and obsolescent military equipment, and after years and decades of deferred replacement, the current cycle of upgrade and replacement is simply too slow compared to very real potential adversaries.
   30. MIKE: For many reasons, we’ve allowed our military-industrial base to atrophy at a time when potential adversaries have been building theirs up. We’ve been using our military assets in ways that degrade them without worthwhile strategic purpose or long-range considerations of how these uses have wasted time and resources needed for greater purposes.
   31. MIKE: And we’ve been reducing the tax base we need in order to accomplish these things in a fiscally responsible way by giving tax breaks to people and corporations that don’t need them at the expense of the greater national good.
   32. MIKE: It’s always important to remember that building a military to deter a war, while expensive, is still much cheaper than fighting a war.
   33. MIKE: I think that in view of the changing global situation, it’s time to seriously reexamine our national goals and priorities —civilian, defense, and fiscal — in order to rebuild both our human and industrial national assets.
   34. REFERENCE: US Aims to ‘Avoid Fighting a Land War in Asia’ — ORG (The Association Of The United States Army) | Mon, 03/06/2023
4. And speaking of possible future conflict with China … Next, from the Eurasian Times — S.-China War: Leaked Pentagon Report Says USA Would Lose “Every Time” Without Major Reforms; By Sakshi Tiwari | EURASIANTIMES.COM | December 11, 2025. TAGS: China, Taiwan, Chinese PLA (People’s Liberation Army), War Games,
   1. China considers self-ruled Taiwan as a renegade Chinese province and has vowed to unite it with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary.
   2. In fact, the Chinese PLA (People’s Liberation Army) forces routinely conduct military exercises simulating encirclement of the island state and a naval blockade aimed at cutting off the strait from external interference.
   3. China takes its claims over Taiwan very seriously, rejecting all external support. This was recently demonstrated when a Japanese F-15J was targeted by a Chinese J-15 fighter, which intermittently locked its fire-control radar on the Japanese aircraft during an encounter southeast of Okinawa.
   4. But more importantly, it appears to be a clear warning to Tokyo, and perhaps to all other Taiwan sympathisers, against challenging China’s actions in Taiwan. 
   5. Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed China’s [PLA] to be ready for a Taiwan invasion as early as 2027, framing it as an “historical inevitability.”
   6. Whether the United States would intervene militarily if China invades Taiwan remains one of the most debated issues in US foreign policy.
   7. Currently, the US officially maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity”—neither admitting nor denying that it would directly protect Taiwan in such a circumstance, to discourage both Chinese invasion and Taiwanese declarations of independence.
   8. However, military analysts predict that Washington could go to war with China if Taiwan were invaded.
   9. MIKE: And referring back to my discussion from last week, would the US defend Taiwan if China conducted a naval blockade, or would that be a “gray” area for US intervention? Continuing …]
   10. Notably, both sides have been preparing for that kind of eventuality, as evidenced by the consistent shift in strategy, a sustained military modernization, and the many war games that have taken place over the last couple of years.
   11. The Pentagon’s multiyear, confidential “Overmatch” brief, which was cited by The New York Times editorial board [last week], examines US military weaknesses in the event of a major confrontation with China over Taiwan.
   12. It highlights how the US’s long-standing military advantages are quickly disappearing and is based on comprehensive war games, simulations, and intelligence studies. The report was leaked and first detailed publicly in a NYT opinion piece on December 8, 2025.
   13. The assessment warns that the United States will suffer catastrophic losses without significant reforms.
   14. … The “Overmatch” brief highlights China’s capability to destroy US satellites, large ships, and fighter aircraft, while also highlighting significant supply-chain weaknesses in the event of a potential conflict with the United States.
   15. The document is prepared by the Pentagon’s internal think tank, called the Office of Net Assessment. When a top Biden national security official read the “Overmatch” brief in 2021, he became “pale” upon realizing that “every trick we had up our sleeve, the Chinese had redundancy after redundancy,” according to the NYT.
   16. Further, the report highlighted that Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, said last November 2024 in the Pentagon’s war games against China, “we lose every time.”
   17. The assessment purportedly emphasized that while adversaries use low-cost, scalable technology such as drones, hypersonic weapons, and cyber tools, the US military clings to costly, slow-to-produce, and vulnerable equipment.
   18. This mismatch risks defeat in potential flashpoints like Taiwan, where simulations show consistent US losses, the NYT stated.
   19. The latest US Navy aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, which cost $13 billion to build and was inducted in 2022, was used as an example in the report.  
   20. The report said the carrier would not be able to withstand a Chinese strike even with the upgraded technologies, such as more sophisticated nuclear reactors. Even though the carrier could prove to be effective against weaker powers like Venezuela (where it has been deployed), it would be “fatally vulnerable to new forms of attack,” the NYT article stated.
   21. In a 2005 war scenario, a US Nimitz-class carrier was hit by several torpedoes from Sweden’s Gotland-class diesel-powered submarine, which, the editorial stated, would have theoretically sunk the carrier.
   22. In the same breath, it questioned why successive US administrations continued to adhere to the concept of depending on its fleet of super carriers and accompanying carrier strike groups (CSGs) when drones, threats to underwater cables, and Chinese spyware came to define new forms of warfare.
   23. China could cripple key US assets before they even reach the theatre. Chinese hypersonic missiles could sink carriers “within minutes.”
   24. The report also cautioned that the United States lacks the industrial capacity to manufacture weapons and ammunition at the volume and speed necessary for a protracted battle with a major power like China. It states that the US defense industrial base is hobbled by long timelines, aging shipyards, and about five dominant contractors, making a surge in production nearly impossible.
   25. Since Washington “over-relies on expensive and vulnerable weapons,” it is lagging behind Beijing and Moscow in developing cutting-edge weaponry, it noted.
   26. For perspective, China’s shipbuilding is 230 times the US scale, fuelled by lower costs and a wartime industrial footing, as previously acknowledged by US lawmakers.
   27. In the past, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan had warned that in a conflict with China, the US would “rapidly run out of essential munitions” like artillery shells and anti-ship missiles.
   28. Meanwhile, China boasts of large stockpiles of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic/cruise missiles, along with about 600 hypersonic missiles, which can be used to neutralize US assets from afar. These attacks could further be supplemented with attacks from drones, small robotic systems, and invasion barges.
   29. China, on its part, has been preparing countermeasures to every US innovation, from satellite jamming to submarine evasion, according to the NYT.
   30. The assessment states that the US could exhaust critical munitions, such as long-range anti-ship missiles, in as little as a week of intense fighting. For context, the US used about a quarter of its high-altitude interceptors defending Israel from a 12-day Iranian barrage in June 2025. This was also highlighted by defense analyst Seth Jones in an interview with Fox News Digital on December 9. Jones cautioned that the United States would run out of critical long-range missiles “after roughly a week or so of conflict” if war broke out.
   31. Additionally, it highlights the risks posed by Cyber Warfare, noting that malware such as Volt Typhoon could cripple bases.
   32. The [Times] editorial highlights Ukraine’s success against Russia as proof that newer technologies and doctrines can outmatch large conventional forces: Kyiv’s uncrewed surface vehicles crippled the Black Sea Fleet, while its drones destroyed many of Russia’s heavy bombers.
   33. Thus, the editorial makes a case for a shift from high-cost platforms to low-cost disruptors, in line with evolving threats.
   34. It assesses that the US must dump bespoke systems in favour of mass-producible ones like cheap drones; integrate Artificial Intelligence (AI), and surveillance; adopt a “wartime footing” with multiyear procurement; allied shipyard use, and streamlined contracting; increase spending beyond 3% GDP to match Cold War levels; pool resources with partners for joint production; [and] reducing reliance on US solo efforts.
   35. But more importantly, it states that the US must snap out of the traditional mindset that sophisticated equals superior, and keep up with the times.
   36. The US military, Pentagon, and think tanks have conducted several war games and simulations in the past few years. One thing common to all these games is that the US would have no easy triumph in a conflict with China, and even if it manages to win, that victory would come at a very high cost. 
   37. The best time for the US to act on vulnerabilities against an ever-growing Chinese military threat was yesterday, but the second-best may be now.
   38. MIKE: As I’ve said many times on this show, Ukraine will be — and perhaps should now be — a vital resource for US and NATO military innovation. Ukraine has proven that it can effectively fight an asymmetric war with considerable success, and perhaps could even win with sufficient Western support.
   39. MIKE: Ukraine’s tactical and technological military knowledge and proven experience should be used by the US and NATO not only for their own good, but as part of Allied support for, and preservation of, Ukraine as a vital defense asset for the West.
5. This next story from the EURASIAN TIMES is one that I have heavily edited — S. Beats China To The Punch: Pulls Out F/A-18 Super Hornet & MH-60R Sea Hawk From South China Sea; By Sakshi Tiwari | EURASIANTIMES.COM | December 9, 2025. TAGS: US Navy, MH-60R Sea Hawk Helicopter, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, USS Nimitz, China, Safeguard-Class Salvage Ship USNS SALVOR (T-ARS 52),
   1. In a shocking and inexplicable incident on October 26, a US Navy MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter … and [an] F/A-18E/F Super Hornet … crashed into the South China Sea within 30 minutes of each other.
   2. Both aircraft were reportedly operating out of the supercarrier USS Nimitz. …
   3. Recovery efforts were launched almost instantly, and the US Navy has since been trying to pull the aircraft out from the depths of the contested South China Sea. …
   4. The efforts finally yielded results on December 5, as noted by the US Seventh Fleet in an official statement on December 8. …
   5. Both aircraft were retrieved from a depth of about 400 feet, as per the official statement.
   6. The crashes occurred in relatively shallow waters of the South China Sea, a strategically contested region where China claims nearly the entire area, despite an international tribunal ruling against those assertions. …
   7. The aircraft’s condition and the state of its systems at the time of retrieval have not been further disclosed by the Navy, and there is no information on whether it could be repaired and reintroduced into service. …
   8. The US Navy expedited the recovery of the wreckage amid fears that sensitive technology could fall into the hands of the Chinese if they got there first.
   9. [Carl Schuster, the former head of the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, was quoted by CNN November 2025 as saying,] “Acquiring an air frame and surviving systems will … provide valuable insights into its technological strengths and how to defeat it tactically.”
   10. Experts point out that the Super Hornet’s sophisticated avionics, radar systems, and electronic warfare capabilities may influence China’s continued improvements to its J-15 carrier-based fighters.
   11. Meanwhile, MH-60R, equipped with cutting-edge anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensors and dipping sonar, represents a technological edge in underwater detection that China is actively seeking to match.
   12. To be more specific, the US Navy was worried about the F/A-18F’s AN/APG-79(V)4 AESA radar array, which is still more advanced than anything on the J-15 or J-20 in certain modes, being compromised.
   13. Additionally, it wanted to prevent China from getting its hands on the MH-60R’s AN/AQS-22 ALFS low-frequency dipping sonar, which is the exact system China has repeatedly tried (and failed) to fully replicate for its Z-20F naval helicopter. …
   14. If China wanted to access the wreckage first, it would have a home advantage. In fact, the urgency of this operation could be gauged from the fact that the US pulled out the two aircraft from China’s neighborhood in less than two months, even though the three F/A-18E/F Super Hornets that were lost in the Red Sea are yet to be recovered.
   15. Having said that, the latest episode is reminiscent of the US recovery effort for the F-35 that crashed in the South China Sea while attempting to land on the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier.
   16. A Navy recovery crew eventually managed to retrieve the F-35 from 12,400 feet (3,700 meters) below the surface to protect it from Beijing.
   17. MIKE: This story is a reminder that military training and so-called “routine operations” are not without risk and danger to our military personnel, nor are they cheap. Fortunately, the crews of these aircraft and of the ship they were lost from are okay.
   18. MIKE: An F-35 can cost up to $100 million per aircraft. MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopters costs up $40 million each. The cost of recovery may have exceeded the cost of both aircraft combined.
   19. MIKE: And even these numbers don’t include the enormous investment cost of the technology that could have been lost and compromised to a potential adversary nation if these aircraft had not been recovered by us, thus justifying the cost of the operation.
   20. MIKE: Nations go to great effort, cost, and risk to acquire copies of the military equipment from adversary nations, and to prevent competitor nations from acquiring copies of theirs.
   21. MIKE: In wartime, if a friendly aircraft goes down safely in enemy territory, it’s routine procedure for the pilot to destroy that aircraft. Sometimes that effort succeeds, sometimes it doesn’t.
   22. MIKE: A helicopter in the bin-Laden raid was lost in Pakistan. While explosives were used to destroy it, some portions with previously secret silencing modifications survived and effectively became what amounts to public domain.
   23. MIKE: There are photos of Allied aircraft captured by the Germans in WW2 and marked with swastikas and iron crosses.
   24. MIKE: These aircraft were intensely studied by German engineers and flown by German test pilots. The goal of the engineers was to discover technology that might be worth adapting. The test pilots explored the strong and weak points of the aircraft’s performance capabilities in order to be able to defeat them more successfully in combat.
   25. MIKE: After these examinations were completed, functioning enemy aircraft were sometimes put into routine service.
   26. MIKE: The Allies did the same thing with captured German aircraft.
   27. MIKE: And in 1976, a Soviet pilot defected to Japan with his MiG-25. From the Wikipedia article on this subject, “The examination revealed to the US that while impressive in speed, the MiG-25 was not the superfighter that they had feared it to be. It was later returned to the Soviets while it was still disassembled with some parts missing.”
   28. MIKE: One of the surprising discoveries the US made in that instance was that the MiG-25 used miniaturized vacuum tubes in its electronics rather than solid-state parts.
   29. MIKE: This sort of effort is routinely followed with all military equipment captured from adversary and enemy states.
   30. So to return to the point of the article, all of the above is why the US considered it essential to spend the money to secure these planes from the bottom of the South China Sea before the Chinese could mount an effort to recover them.
6. Finally, from BusinessInsider — A new combat-proven ballistic missile shield that shot down Iranian threats is now deployed to Europe; By Jake Epstein | BUSINESSINSIDER.COM | Dec 3, 2025, 9:16 AM CT. TAGS: Germany, Israel, Iran, Air Defense Systems,
   1. A top Israeli air defense system credited with defeating waves of Iranian ballistic missiles is now, for the first time, in the hands of a foreign military and set to boost European defense.
   2. The deployment of the Arrow 3 ballistic missile shield to Germany comes as NATO forces look to strengthen their long-range air defenses in the face of growing threats from Russia to the east. The system can intercept missile targets beyond Earth’s atmosphere, making it a high-value acquisition.
   3. Boaz Levy, CEO of the state-run Israel Aerospace Industries, told Business Insider that Arrow 3 is the “perfect solution” for Germany to defend not only its own population but also that of its European neighbors from potential ballistic missile threats.
   4. Levy, Arrow’s chief engineer, said the defensive system has intercepted hundreds of ballistic missiles launched by Iran and its Middle East allies over the past few years, describing Arrow as a “combat-proven” air defense.
   5. The $3.5 billion sale of Arrow 3 to Germany in September 2023 is considered Israel’s largest-ever defense export deal, officials said.
   6. Israel’s defense ministry said on Wednesday that it had handed over the first operational Arrow 3 system to the German military, officially giving Berlin control of the air defense.
   7. The Arrow systems are a joint product of IAI and US aerospace giant Boeing. Arrow 2 was deployed in 2000 and can intercept missiles in the upper atmosphere, while the newer Arrow 3 became operational in 2017 and can eliminate targets in space.
   8. Both Arrow systems use a two-stage solid-fueled interceptor to strike incoming ballistic missiles and have been used in combat in recent years, making up the top level of Israel’s vaunted air defense network.
   9. Israel has used Arrow to shield the country during three confrontations with Iran, which launched some 120 ballistic missiles at the country in April 2024, more than 180 ballistic missiles in October 2024, and over 550 ballistic missiles this past June.
   10. Arrow, which has also intercepted ballistic missiles launched at Israel by Houthi rebels in Yemen, underwent several upgrades and software tweaks ahead of Israel’s most recent clash with Iran — its most serious one yet — to improve the system’s performance.
   11. Levy said that Arrow was challenged many times and faced its toughest tests against the salvos of Iranian missiles, rather than lone Houthi launches. However, he said the air defense system proved itself “in a phenomenal way” with an interception rate of greater than 90%.
   12. He said that IAI is currently developing an upgraded interceptor, the Arrow 4, that will eventually replace the decades-old Arrow 2 model.
   13. Arrow’s deployment to Germany comes as European countries face what Western officials warn is a rising Russian threat along NATO’s eastern edge.
   14. In its ongoing war against Ukraine, the Russian military regularly attacks cities and civilian infrastructure with strike packages consisting of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as hundreds of one-way attack drones. These attacks have pushed NATO countries to deploy additional defenses along the alliance’s eastern flank.
   15. [Other] European countries are also purchasing new air defenses. Denmark, for instance, just inked a deal to buy Norway’s National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) and is expected to procure the French-Italian SAMP/T system as well. And now, IAI’s Arrow 3 is going live in Germany.
   16. Arrow will augment Germany’s existing air defense network, which consists of the domestically produced IRIS-T SLM and the US-made MIM-104 Patriot, among other systems.
   17. The Patriot, a long-range surface-to-air missile system, is another proven air defense system that has served as the top echelon of Ukraine’s air defense network, defending the country from Russian bombardments.
   18. MIKE: I don’t have time to add much except to say that the world as really changed when the Jews are arming Germany.
7. MIKE: I don’t have time to add much except to say that the world as really changed when the Jews are sending military hardware to Germany.

There’s always more to discuss, but that’s all we have time for today.